Social Media & Cultural Warfare: A Synopsis

Throughout ever research project in the social Web, we encounter the nasty stuff. From spam and porn content through to anti-societal groups and racism. Just as there is much good to social media, there is the bad. One of these more frightening aspects is what we term “Cultural Cyber Warfare.” This means information (videos, blogs, tweets etc.) that is created by one cultural/ethnic/religious group (all non-state actors) against another. Such hate content has been around for centuries in various forms, sometimes as state-sanctioned propaganda and at other times by non-state actors and groups.

With social medias and current technologies however, such rhetoric is far easier to create and broadcast than ever before. For the most part, such destructive content is seen for what it is and easily dismissed. But sometimes we argue, this is not the right way to view such content. Our research results are indicating that radical groups and other non-state actors are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their use of social media technologies to conduct information warfare or psyops. And it may have a real-world effect on peace negotiations in fragile or conflict ridden states, between religios groups in fragile states and so on.

In the case of Iran, we can see that the Basij has become very sophisticated and coordinated in their counter-revolutionary tactics through blogs, forums, Facebook and other social networking sites. They regularly counter claims by would-be revolutionaries. Information the Basij gains on Iranians living in Iran via Iranian diaspora is often used to arrest and imprison the resident Iranians.

Throughout YouTube and other video sites there are Islamic fundamentalist videos that aim to recruit youth and others and even convert more moderate and liberal Muslims (which is the majority of Muslims anyway.) Increasingly, we see pro-Palestinian groups creating anti-Israeli propaganda.

There are several ways that such information warfare in social media can spill into the real-world and here are some of them;

• Drive recruiting of youth or disenfranchised people, resulting in increased activists that can lead to larger protests on city streets
• Create perceived tensions between affected groups that hampers negotiating efforts
• Unnoticed, this tension can undermine relations between communities and state actors may not understand underlying reasons
• Aggressor states may use so-called “civil society” groups or non-state actors to conduct psyops at a distance to disrupt negotiations or identify potential protestors and dissidents to arrest, compromising legitimate protest.
• Flushing out opponents for violent acts

Governments and other organizations, including multi-national companies operating in fragile states will need to pay ever more closer attention to these issues to avoid security risk for personnel and to provide situational awareness for negotiations and other international relations purposes. Such activity will only increase in the coming years as regions like the Middle East and Western Africa undergo huge political and societal shifts.